What is a Consensus Mechanism?

The “Double Spend” Problem

The creation of blockchain technology stems from the early mathematical studies of encryption using computer technology.

One such example is related to the information-encoding device, “Enigma,” invented by the Germans at the end of World War I. Alan Turing, a British Intelligence agent, famously beat the Enigma device by inventing the world’s first “digital computer.” This provided enough computing power to break Enigma’s encryption and discover German secret communications.

This early affair with encryption set off a race throughout the world to develop myriad forms of securely transferring information from one party to another via computer technology. While each new form of computer encryption provided more advantages, there remained one problem that prevented encryption from being useful as a means of transferring not just information, but also financial value.

This challenge is known as the “Double Spend” problem. The issue lies in the ability of computers to endlessly duplicate information. In the case of financial value, there are three important things to record: who owns a specific value; the time at which the person owns this value; the wallet address in which the value resides. When transferring financial value from one person to another, it is essential that if Person A sends money to Person B, Person A should not be able to duplicate the same money and send it again to Person C.

The Bitcoin protocol, invented by an anonymous person (or persons) claiming the name of Satoshi Nakamoto, solved the Double Spend problem. The underlying math and computer code is both highly complex and innovative. For the purposes of this paper we need only focus on the one aspect of the Bitcoin protocol that solves the Double Spend problem: the consensus mechanism.

The Consensus Mechanism Provides Security Against a “Double Spend”

The consensus mechanism created by Nakamoto is perhaps one of the most powerful innovations of the twenty-first century. His invention allows individual devices to work together, using high levels of encryption, to securely and accurately track ownership of digital value (be it financial resources, digital real estate, etc.). It performs this in a manner that does not allow anyone on the same network (i.e. the Internet) to spend the same value twice.

Let us suppose a user, Alice, indicates in her digital wallet that she wants to send digital currency money to a friend. We call digital currency “cryptocurrency,” because it is currency that relies on cryptography to maintain its security.

Alice’s computer gathers several pieces of information, including any necessary permissions and passwords, the amount that Alice wants to spend, and the receiving address of her friend’s wallet. All this information is gathered into a collection of data, called a “transaction,” and Alice’s device sends the transaction to the Internet.

There are several types of devices that will interact with Alice’s transaction. These devices will share the transaction information with other devices supporting the cryptocurrency network. For this discussion, we need only focus on one type of device: a cryptocurrency miner.

A Miner Competes to Add Blocks to the Network’s History, in Exchange for a Reward

Step One: Preparing the Preliminary Information

This cryptocurrency “mining” computer captures Alice’s raw transaction data. Typically, this mining device is owned by a tech-savvy miner. In this discussion, we name him Bob.

Bob wants to add Alice’s transaction to the permanent history of the Bitcoin network. If Bob is the first person to properly process Alice’s transaction he will receive a financial reward. One key part of this reward is a percentage-based fee, taken from Alice’s total transaction amount.

The Mempool is the Collection of All Raw Transactions Waiting to be Processed

Furthermore, Bob does not have just one transaction alone to mine. Rather, he has an entire pool of raw transactions, created by many people across the Internet. The raw data for each of these transactions sits in the local memory bank of each miner’s mining device, awaiting the miner’s commands. Miners call this pool of transactions, the “mempool.” Most miners have automated systems to determine the transaction-selection process, based on estimated profit.

Creating Transaction Hashes

After Bob makes his choices about which transactions he will attempt to mine (and we assume that he includes Alice’s transaction), Bob’s mining device then begins a series of calculations.

His device will first take each individual transaction’s raw data and use mathematical formulas to compress the transaction into a smaller, more manageable form. This new form is called a “transaction hash.” For instance, Alice’s transaction hash could look like this:

b1fea52486ce0c62bb442b530a3f0132b826c74e473d1f2c220bfa78111c5082

Bob will prepare potentially hundreds of transaction hashes before proceeding to the next step. One important thing to understand about the compression of data in the Bitcoin protocol, including the transaction hash above, is that calculations herein obey a principle called, The Cascade Effect.

The Cascade Effect: Changing One Bit of Data Changes the Entire Result

The Cascade Effect simply means that were Bob to attempt to change even the smallest bit in the raw data—whether from a desire to cheat, or by mistake, or for any other reason—the entire transaction hash would dramatically change. In this way, the mathematical formulas in the Bitcoin protocol ensure that Bob cannot create an improper history.

Were Bob to attempt to create an incorrect transaction hash, other miners on the network could use the raw transaction data from Alice, perform the proper mathematical formulas in the Bitcoin protocol, and immediately discover that Bob’s hashes are incorrect. Thus, all the devices on the network would reject Bob’s incorrect attempts and prevent him from claiming rewards.

Step One Continued: Finishing the Preliminary Calculations

Now, using more mathematical formulas, Bob takes the transaction hashes he is attempting to process and compresses them into a new manageable piece of data.

This is called, “the merkle root.” It represents all the transactions that Bob hopes to process, and from which he hopes to gain a reward. Bob’s merkle root could look like this:

7dac2c5666815c17a3b36427de37bb9d2e2c5ccec3f8633eb91a4205cb4c10ff

Finally, Bob will gather information provided from the last miner that successfully added to the permanent blockchain history. This information is called, “the block header.” It contains a large amount of complex data, and we won’t go into all the details. The one important element to note is that the block header gives Bob clues about how to properly add the next piece of information to the permanent Bitcoin history. One of these hints could look like this:

"difficulty" : 1.00000000

We will return to this clue further on.

Having all this information, Bob is nearly prepared. His next step is where the real challenge begins.

Step Two: The Race to Finish First

Bob’s computer is going to gather all the above information and collect it into a set of data called a “block.” Mining this block and adding it to the list of blocks that came before is the process of creating a “chain” of blocks—hence the industry title, “blockchain.”

However, adding blocks to the blockchain is not so easy. While Bob may have everything up to this point correctly prepared, the Bitcoin protocol does not yet give Bob the right to add his proposed block to the chain.

The consensus mechanism is designed to force the miners to compete for this right. By requiring the miners to work for the right to mine a new valid block, competition spreads across the network. This provides many benefits, including time for the transactions of users (like Alice) to disseminate around the world, thus providing a level of decentralization to the network.

Therefore, although Bob would prefer to immediately create a new valid block and collect his reward, he cannot. He must win the competition by performing the proper work first. This is the source of the title of the Bitcoin-protocol consensus mechanism, “Proof of Work” (PoW).

The competition that Bob must win is to be the first person to find an answer to a simple mathematical puzzle, designed by Satoshi Nakamoto. To solve the puzzle, Bob guesses at random numbers until he discovers a correct number. The correct number is determined by the internal complex formulas of the consensus mechanism and cannot be discovered by any means other than guessing. Bitcoin miners call this number a “nonce,” which is short for “a ‘number’ you use ‘once.’”

Bob’s mining device will make random guesses at the nonce, one after another, until a correct nonce is found. With each attempt, Bob will first insert the proposed nonce into the rest of his block. To find out if his guess is correct, he will next use mathematical formulas (like those he used earlier) to compress his attempt into a “block hash.” A block hash is a small and manageable form of data that represents the entire history of the Bitcoin blockchain and all the information in Bob’s proposed block. A block hash can look like this:

000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f

Recall now The Cascade Effect, and how it states that changing one small number in the data before performing the mathematical computations creates a vastly different outcome. Since Bob is continually including new guesses at the nonce with each computation of a block hash, each block-hash attempt will produce a widely different sequence of numbers. Miners on the Bitcoin network know when a miner, such as Bob, solves the puzzle; by observing the clues that were provided earlier. Recall that the last time a miner successfully added data to the blockchain, they provided these clues in their block header. One of the clues from the previous block header can look like this:

"difficulty" : 1.00000000

This detail, “difficulty,” simply tells miners how many zeros should be at the front of the next valid block hash. When the difficulty setting is the level displayed above, it tells miners that there should be exactly ten zeros. Observe Bob’s attempted block hash once again, which he created after making a guess at a nonce, adding this proposed nonce into his block, and performing the mathematical formulas:

000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f

The block hash above has ten zeros at the beginning, which matches the number of zeros in the difficulty level. Therefore, the hash that Bob proposed is correct. This must mean that he guessed a correct nonce. All the miners on the network can prove for themselves that Bob was correct by taking all the same information from their mempools, adding Bob’s nonce, and performing the mathematical calculations. They will receive the same result, and therefore Bob is the winner of this round.

On the other hand, due to the Cascade Effect, if Bob’s attempted nonce had produced a block hash with the incorrect number of zeros at the front, his block hash would be invalid. The network would not afford him the right to add an incorrect block hash to the network, and all the miners would continue searching.

Step Three: Bob Finds the Nonce

Once a miner discovers a nonce that produces a valid block hash, the miner has “found a new block,” and can send the signal across the Internet. The consensus mechanism running on every other mining device can verify for themselves the calculations. Once verified, the consensus mechanism grants the miner the right both to add the proposed block to the blockchain, and to receive the reward.

Let us return to Bob’s machine, having just guessed a correct nonce, and thus holding a valid block hash. Bob’s machine instantly sends out the winning information across the Internet, and Bob collects his reward from the Bitcoin network. All the other miners must readjust. Earlier, they were searching for the correct nonce based off the information from the previous block header. However, Bob’s new valid block includes a new block header. All the other miners on the network abandon their current work, adopt Bob’s new block header, make many recalculations in their underlying data, and begin their search for the next nonce.

There is no sympathy in the Bitcoin protocol for any miner’s wasted efforts. Suppose another machine on the network was also trying to mine Alice’s transaction, and lost to Bob in the race. Only Bob earns the reward from Alice’s transaction, and the other miner receives nothing in return for their costs and time.

For Alice, this process seems simple. She first indicated the wallet address of her friend and sent cryptocurrency. After a certain amount of time, her friend received the money. Alice can ignore the byzantine process of the miners that occurred between these two events. Alice may not realize it, but the PoW consensus mechanism provides the foundation of security upon which she relies.

The Dominance of the Proof-of-Work Consensus Mechanism

Proof of Work (PoW) Fosters Ever Increasing Security

There are several reasons why PoW networks, especially Bitcoin, continue to dominate in terms of security and blockchain success.

A simple, preliminary reason is that PoW networks foster ever-increasing speed and computer power. Miners must constantly update and innovate above their competitors to continue earning rewards.

Speed and Power are of the Essence

Among miners, having a faster and more powerful computer can mean earning rewards more frequently. For miners seeking to maximize profit, competition requires constant upgrades to machinery and to a miner’s customized underlying code.

The frequency at which a device can create proposed block hashes is called “hash power.” The more hash power a collective PoW network has across all miners mining the blockchain, the more secure the network. This competitive pressure provides one important advantage in security to PoW networks, when compared to alternate consensus mechanisms.

The Network Effect: Bitcoin’s Ability to Dominate Begins

A high level of security fosters a sense of trust among users, and this can grow a PoW network’s audience. As the audience grows, both the number of transactions and the price of the coin increase. This attracts more miners. The rising level of miners provides greater overall hash rate to the network, which in turn fosters a stronger sense of trust. This increased sense of security can raise the number of users on the network, which can increase the number of miners, and the cycle repeats.

In economics, this is classified as a “Network Effect,” where a cycle of behavior encourages more of the same behavior, with compounding interest. Due to the Network Effect, and the fact that Bitcoin is the oldest PoW network, Bitcoin is increasing its security at a rate faster than the rate of other PoW networks.

Furthermore, consider the effect caused when the price of a PoW-blockchain coin rises. Before the rise, assume the blockchain coin is worth one dollar. A miner is justified in spending the necessary money (on equipment, upgrades, and electrical costs, etc.) to justify one dollar’s worth of hash rate. If the price shifts upwards to two dollars, the miner must upgrade their entire business to justify two dollars’ worth of a matching hash rate. If the miner does not upgrade, their competitor will, and then the miner will no longer be able to compete for rewards.

The Longest Chain Rule: The True “Secret Sauce” of Pow Domination

There are many more reasons why PoW networks continue to dominate in security. Yet, for our discussion, there is one element that rises above all others. It is called, “The Longest Chain Rule,” and some blockchain developers argue that it is “the secret sauce” that fuels PoW’s strength.

The Longest Chain Rule is the determining factor whenever two competing versions of the blockchain history arise on the network. The rule simply states that whichever of the two versions grows longer first, wins. The other version is overwritten, and therefore all transactions and rewards on that version are erased. The simplicity of this rule is a key to understanding why PoW consensus mechanisms continue to outperform their competition.

The Simple Effects of The Longest Chain Rule

On a surface level, this rule prevents a double spend by a network user. For instance, consider a husband and wife accidentally attempting to spend the same money at the exact same time, while each person is traveling in a different part of the world.

Note: For the sake of the discussion, we are oversimplifying the following actions so that they take place within only a few milliseconds. We also oversimplify the technical details, for clarity. The full explanation of this process is provided in the Bitcoin wiki, for those who would like to gain a deeper understanding.

A Tale of Two Blockchains

Let us suppose that the husband is in Asia and the wife is in the Americas. Both are purchasing a car. The husband uses all the funds from the family Bitcoin wallet to purchase a car at precisely 8:00 PM (UTC). The wife makes her purchase at the exact same moment, for a similar amount.

After making his purchase, the husband’s transaction hash is immediately sent to a mining device in China, where it is held in the miner’s local mempool (recall that a mempool is a collection of all raw transaction data across the network).

Let us suppose that the husband’s transaction arrives in the Chinese miner’s mempool at the exact moment that the Chinese mining equipment finds a correct nonce and a valid block hash. The Chinese miner declares the winning information, mines a new block, and collects a reward. All the miners in his local (Asian) vicinity (who receive the winning information faster than in the Americas, due to proximity) complete the block verification process, increase the length of the blockchain, and begin searching for the next valid block hash.

On the opposite side of the world, essentially the exact same actions happen. The wife’s transaction is sent to the nearest miner, this time located in Washington state of the United States. Just as the transaction enters the Washington state miner’s mempool, the miner discovers a valid block hash. He sends out the signal, mines a new block, and also collects the reward (this is the same reward that the Chinese miner is attempting to claim). All the miners in the local (US) vicinity verify the information immediately and begin searching for a new valid block hash based on the Washington state miner’s recent block.

An Internal Conflict of Interest Arises Within the Bitcoin Network

Note the paradox here. There are now two versions of the Bitcoin history that are valid, yet different.

These two versions make their way across the Internet, around the world, each to the other side. When the competing messages arrive, the Bitcoin protocol sees that there is a conflict: the same money was spent twice.

Consider how on each side of the world the miners are spending their financial and temporal resources to further their own interests. There is no economic incentive for either side to submit to the other, by nature. Therefore, there is a conflict of interest within the Bitcoin network itself. The Bitcoin network would swiftly fail, were it not for The Longest Chain Rule.

The Longest Chain Rule: The History Which is Longer First, Wins

The Longest Chain Rule simply declares that whichever of the two competing blockchains grows longer first, wins. The consensus mechanism erases the other version.

Let us suppose that the Chinese mining equipment is superior in this instance, and the Chinese miner manages to discover the next valid block hash and send out the signal before the Washington state miner can do likewise. Across the world, the moment the information arrives that the Chinese miner completed yet another valid block, the Bitcoin protocol erases the Washington state miner’s version of the Bitcoin history.

There is no sympathy for any wasted efforts, nor for any misunderstandings between the wife and her car dealer. The Bitcoin protocol’s consensus mechanism simply presses forward. The Washington state miner’s rewards disappear, as though they never occurred. The wife’s purchase of a car likewise evaporates.

(Typically, a normal and prepared car dealer utilizing cryptocurrency would not consider a customer’s transactions acceptable until several new blocks were added to the blockchain. In this manner, cryptocurrency users can ensure that a transaction is beyond contestation before the customer can, for example, drive a new car off the lot.)

The Washington state miner gets a raw deal in this scenario, but the network benefits as a whole. The Longest Chain Rule provides the necessary security to prevent a Double Spend. The network accurately recorded one family member’s purchase of a car, prevented the mistaken double spend, and ensured that the most competitive miner received a just reward.

This example illuminates the importance of The Longest Chain Rule. However, there is a dark side to this rule for the unsuspecting and unprepared blockchain developer.

The 51% Attack

Here’s where intrigue enters the picture. The “easiest” way to steal money on a PoW blockchain (such as Bitcoin) is to perform a 51% Attack.

In this attack, the malicious actor first spends cryptocurrency in exchange for something of value, which they take from their victim. Next, the malicious actor creates an alternate version of the PoW network’s history wherein those transactions never took place. Using advanced mining equipment, the malicious actor then “attacks” the PoW network by mining blocks to this “false” history faster than the rate at which other miners on the PoW network can mine blocks to the “true” history.

Assuming the malicious actor has a sufficient hash rate, as this “false” history grows longer than the “true” history, the Longest Chain Rule will cause the consensus mechanism to overwrite the “true” version. The earlier transactions the malicious actor made would be as though they never occurred. Therefore, the malicious actor would keep both their original funds and whatever item of value they exacted from their victim.

This is known as the 51% Attack. The number 51% derives from the fact that to successfully perform this attack, the attacker must add enough hashing power to the overall PoW network to form a majority of the hash rate.

Size is Yet Another Reason Behind Bitcoin’s Current Success Among PoW Networks

Today, Bitcoin’s overall hash rate is enormous. The collective of computers around the world mining Bitcoin is effectively the largest supercomputer ever created by man. As of the writing of this paper, some estimate that the Bitcoin network consumes more electricity than the entire country of Denmark, and the number of miners continues to grow.

Therefore, to attempt a 51% Attack against the Bitcoin network could cost millions, if not billions of dollars in computer hardware. It would also require a sustained consumption of electricity that is likely unfeasible for a single geographical location, and would be expensive even for a decentralized-hardware network. So long as the miners of Bitcoin remain interested in the Bitcoin network, therefore, Bitcoin has a level of security that is nigh impenetrable.

We will return to the proposition of the miners’ ability to choose a different network to mine later in our discussion.

The Genesis Attack

A Genesis Attack on the Bitcoin Network

Recall that according to the original version of the Bitcoin protocol, sometimes called the “vanilla” version, the Longest Chain Rule only requires that the blocks in the longest chain all be properly mined. Furthermore, recall that computers can endlessly duplicate code.

Finally, note that during our explanation, when describing a malicious actor’s attempt to create an empty, meaningless blockchain history, we use quotation marks when employing the word, “false.” Likewise, when describing the blockchain history trusted by the people on the network, we include the word “true” in quotations.

We do this because at the core level, the consensus mechanism is purposefully blind regarding any human user’s preference between “true” and “false.” The code only sees “truth” in terms of properly mined blocks, and overall blockchain length. Nothing more.

Now suppose the existence of a supercomputer a thousand times more powerful than the entirety of the Bitcoin-miner network. This supercomputer could, in theory, stealthily re-create and execute the initial code that spawned the very first block of the Bitcoin blockchain—the “Genesis Block.” The supercomputer could then grind out block hashes, one-by-one, mining meaningless blocks and adding them to this empty, “false” version of the Bitcoin history.

Once this meaningless blockchain’s length sufficiently exceed the so-called “true” blockchain used today, the supercomputer could then release its “false” version to the Internet.

Throughout the world, (assuming the vanilla protocol) the Bitcoin network would automatically recognize the “false” blockchain as the correct blockchain! This would all be according to the code. The so-called “false” blocks would be properly mined, and the length would be longer than the chain that users currently trust. The vanilla protocol would, in theory, replace the so-called “true” history with the empty variant.

It might seem to users like a virus being uploaded to the Internet. It could destroy all human trust in the current version of the Bitcoin protocol, wreaking financial havoc throughout the cryptocurrency realm. While users of the Bitcoin protocol would naturally protest, the entire operation would be entirely in agreement with the underlying code.

When observing Bitcoin’s current hash power, the creation of such an anti-Bitcoin supercomputer is clearly not feasible in the immediate future. Assuming Bitcoin miners remain interested in the Bitcoin network, the risk of a Genesis Attack on Bitcoin is essentially non-existent.

However, consider the implications of the Genesis Attack on unsuspecting or underprepared smaller PoW blockchain projects.

The More Realistic Dangers of The Genesis Attack

Let us assume a naïve blockchain entrepreneur building a new product. They are generally aware that malicious actors throughout the world are likely to attack their blockchain, stealing funds and otherwise causing trouble. Therefore, the naïve entrepreneur decides to implement what they believe is the most secure method of a blockchain consensus mechanism, PoW, and they offer ample financial rewards to miners to incentivize a secure network.

The entrepreneur and their entire audience may not realize it, but so long as their network’s overall hash rate remains below the threshold of an attack by even an average supercomputer, their entire blockchain history is vulnerable to complete annihilation. A technically astute competitor, seeing the vulnerability, and possessing ownership of the requisite computer hardware, would be able to create an empty and longer version of the same blockchain code and vaporize the blockchain’s financial records.

The cryptocurrency industry is young, and few but the most advanced of developers understand the many ways in which blockchain competition can be technically eliminated. Therefore, we have seen but a few serious cases of the Genesis Attack.

One notable instance occurred when an original Bitcoin developer, Luke-jr, used a variation of the attack to destroy a blockchain project called Coiledcoin. Luke-jr performed this attack out of a belief that Coiledcoin was a disingenuous project. Setting aside any human sentiment on either side of the event, the fact stands that Luke-jr’s variation of the Genesis Attack was the end of the Coiledcoin network.

The complexity in establishing a secure PoW blockchain remains a challenge for would-be entrepreneurs. Furthermore, there are existing PoW developers that are not fully aware of their vulnerability. Likewise, there are would-be malicious actors that have yet to realize the many methods available to cause frustration. The potential danger surrounding the issue of the Genesis Attack shows the relative youthfulness of the cryptocurrency industry.

For a PoW blockchain network to maintain Bitcoin-level security, therefore, it must maintain a hash rate that is high enough to constantly mine blocks faster than a potential competitor could either perform the 51% Attack (destroying the most recent of transactions), or the deadly Genesis Attack (complete annihilation).

The Financial and Eco-Unfriendly Problems With All PoW Networks

The problems with young PoW networks do not stop there, and furthermore, even Bitcoin’s PoW network has issues: the security of a PoW network comes at a high cost to the environment, and miners have no obligation to mine any particular network.

PoW Networks Are Expensive

Some estimate that by 2020, the Bitcoin network alone will consume more electricity than the entire world currently consumes (as of 2017.) Having just one PoW network in existence, therefore, is already strain enough on our environment. It is also a burden on our infrastructure and our worldwide economy.

On the one hand, adding additional PoW blockchains to the world can serve the purpose of forcing free-market competition on the Bitcoin developers, encouraging ethical and innovative behavior. Therefore, some competition among PoW networks is likely useful.

However, as a human species, we can consider that there are more financially sound and eco-friendly methods of innovating with blockchain technology without always directly competing with Bitcoin PoW security.

Miners are Free to Mine Other Networks

Another inherent weakness of the PoW consensus mechanism to discuss is the ability of miners to choose alternate networks.

In November of 2017, for a few hours the majority of Bitcoin network miners switched their hash power to a competitor’s PoW network, the “Bitcoin Cash” network. This switch was the result of clever software engineering on the part of the Bitcoin Cash team.

The team recognized that most miners on the Bitcoin network choose to mine whichever network is most profitable. Therefore, the team conducted a calculated change in their underlying protocol that caused the profitability of the Bitcoin Cash network to dramatically increase. The majority of the world’s Bitcoin miners recognized the higher profitability and switched to the Bitcoin Cash network without further thought.

While Bitcoin Cash’s play for a majority hash rate proved effective only for a matter of hours, their accomplishment raised awareness to a tacit principle in the network: Bitcoin’s hash rate is not bound to Bitcoin. The miners are free to serve any compatible network the miners choose.

At the time of the writing of this paper, between Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash, ~80% of the available hash rate is aligned with the former, and ~20% with the latter. There is speculation in the industry that if the Bitcoin Cash network creates a more favorable position, the balance of hashing power could change on a long-term basis. Furthermore, there are many other blockchain competitors who may gain the attention of Bitcoin’s miners in the future.

Were a shift in the balance of hash rate to occur, Bitcoin would no longer be the leader of security in the cryptocurrency realm. The price of Bitcoin would likely drop as users realized the resulting lack of security leadership. This might cause more miners to switch to a more profitable network to cover the cost of operating their expensive hardware. As miners abandon Bitcoin, and as users continue to leave, the situation becomes a reversal of the Network Effect. The Bitcoin network would come crashing downwards at an ever-compounding rate.

This is all theoretical, but it raises yet another concern: the security of a blockchain depends on many things, including the potentially fickle support of human blockchain miners.

The Primary Alternative: Proof of Stake

Perhaps the most popular alternative consensus mechanism is Proof of Stake (PoS). In this mechanism, blocks are mined not by miners performing work, but rather by any user “staking” their coins on the open network for the right to mine blocks.

The meaning of “staking” has different variations depending on the specific rules set forth by the developers of the unique variant of the PoS consensus mechanism. In general, staking one’s coins means placing them as collateral on the open network in exchange for the right to mine new blocks.

Users who stake their coins, thereby, can periodically extract a portion of the mempool, mine new blocks, and earn rewards. There is no need to perform any hardware-expensive proof-of-work calculations, as the user’s incentive to be honest is encouraged by the fact that their own wealth hangs in the balance.

The Security Risks and Shortcomings of PoS

The downside to PoS is that a user who simply leaves a large portion of wealth staked (and therefore continually claims rewards) gradually becomes a centralized point of wealth through the power of compound interest. On PoS networks, monopolies are a constant danger. The owner of a monopoly has power over the well-being of the network.

Once a majority of the supply is obtained, the owner gains a position known as “Nothing at Stake.” The owner can mine “false” blocks to the PoS blockchain and use their own majority supply over the network to declare these “false” blocks valid. All other stakeholders on the network must adopt these “false” blocks, lest the majority holder use their strength to declare competing blockchain versions as invalid.

If a non-majority holder attempts to challenge the monopoly holder’s version, the non-majority holder can achieve little more than the loss of coins they placed at stake. Compare this with non-majority holder in a PoW system: the question over the “truth” of the blockchain history depends not upon ownership of wealth, but upon the miner’s innovation and performance. PoW-based systems do not suffer from the risk of monopolies, therefore, as majority stakeholders gain no unique control over the mining of new blocks.

Variations of PoS, including the popular Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) and Delegated Byzantine Fault Tolerance (DBFT) systems, do not resolve the underlying issue of monopoly ownership and centralized manipulation. In a vanilla PoS system, the malicious actor needs only to purchase a majority supply of the coin to mine “false” blocks. In a DPoS/DBFT type system, wherein the ecosystem stakeholders elect and endow delegates with the responsibility to mine new blocks, the malicious actor has only to compromise most of the delegates. Thereafter, the compromised delegates can mine “false” blocks, and the users of the ecosystem have no direct means to retaliate, beyond abandoning the network.

This is not to say that PoS and its variants have no use cases. Indeed, there are scenarios in which PoS can be useful for entrepreneurs, as the overhead cost is favorably low.

A Summary of the PoW Consensus Mechanism

In short, the PoW consensus mechanism, as designed by Satoshi Nakamoto, is currently the soundest method of blockchain security. It solves the Double Spend problem and creates a secure network, capable of transferring financial value. Furthermore, competition among miners and the Longest Chain Rule create fairness on the blockchain. The combination of features provides a high level of defense against two of the most dangerous methods of blockchain destruction—the 51% Attack and the Genesis Attack—assuming a strong overall hash rate on the network.

New PoW blockchains can opt to compete directly with Bitcoin’s hash rate, and some level of competition is good for the ethical values and innovative power of the cryptocurrency industry. However, it is not necessary, cost-effective, nor eco-friendly that every new blockchain innovation requiring security should attempt to compete directly with Bitcoin. Not only is this unsustainable, but it is also unreliable, as it depends on the arbitrary choices of the decentralized network of miners around the world.